Kauffman Foundation Research Series:
Expeditionary Economics
Rebecca Patterson and Dane Stangler
Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation
Introduction
In the continuing debates over the future of the
United States military, it has become common to
note that the conflicts for which our armed forces
are nominally prepared—large-scale, interstate wars
on the order of World War II—actually constitute
a fraction of the conflicts in which they have
historically been engaged. Indeed, over the past
century, the U.S. military has frequently found itself
in the business of what is called, accurately or not,
nation-building. This can occur subsequent to a
conflict, as with the Marshall Plan or peacekeeping
operations in the Balkans, or contemporaneously
with fighting, as in the Philippines, Iraq, and
Afghanistan. Less frequently, but of perhaps rising
relevance, civilians and the military engage in efforts
to prevent conflict. In each case, the importance
of economic development to creating security and
sustaining peace has been recognized. Yet the level
of effort devoted to economic development and
the quality of these efforts has been uneven, with
some celebrated as great successes and others
derided as wasteful and peripheral to American
interests. In many ways, in fact, the United States
has yet to develop a coherent or effective approach
to economic development.
The environment for such efforts is often a
dizzying mosaic of organizations and countries
plagued by misaligned—or even contrarily
aligned—incentives, both among themselves
and with the host nation. Familiar problems with
foreign aid include lack of transparency and
accountability as well as disjointed interests among
donors and recipients. Within the American aid
community, bureaucratic constraints hamper
reconstruction and development. Over the past
few years, moreover, the "whole-of-government"
approach touted by the United States has usually
meant an increase of bureaucracy as well as a focus
on what can be measured: namely, the rate at
which budgeted funds can be spent, irrespective of
outcomes. The military, which assumed a leading
development role in Iraq and Afghanistan, has
(understandably) approached the task through the
oppositional lens of conflict, seeing "money as a
weapon system" and dollars as tools to purchase
"hearts and minds." Indeed, a recent neologism
in the post-conflict community is "opposed
development"—development activities undertaken
in the presence of armed opposition.
The emerging field of Expeditionary Economics
addresses itself to these challenges. Regarding
the military, for example, soldiers have consistently
found themselves forced to rebuild economies
without proper doctrinal or institutional support.
For example, the State Department's Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
has promulgated a "useful framework" for
development in the form of an "Essential Task
Matrix," which lists specific tasks within five
"technical sectors." Tasks included in "Economic
Stabilization and Infrastructure" include such
helpful specifics as "employment generation,"
"general economic policy," and "market
economy." While the field manuals published by
the U.S. Army offer more detail in terms of sectors
and important objectives (including "enterprise creation"),
there is little sense of how to implement
such efforts or how to prioritize different tasks.
An individual on the ground is left to his or her
own devices in deciding what to do and how to do
it. Moreover, few personnel and little institutional
memory carry over from one situation to the
next, forcing the relearning of the same lessons.
Expeditionary Economics thus encompasses the
frequent instances in which military and civilian
expeditions must implicitly rebuild an economy.
Fostering economic success—the third leg in
the proverbial stool of diplomacy, defense, and
development—must be made a more effective
dimension of American expeditionary capacity.
More broadly, Expeditionary Economics
(ExpECON) can also be seen as informing larger
ideas about national security, strategy, and the
exercise of power. In particular, economic growth
must play an essential role in these three areas. The
juxtaposition of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
the recession and financial crisis of 2008–09,
and the steadily rising influence of other nations
marks the beginning of a new era facing the
United States. Economic growth—at home and
abroad—can no longer be divorced from strategy
and security. It is a well-accepted adage that
military success without strategic success is not
success, and sustainable peace after conflict has
been a much more elusive goal than military victory
over the past two decades. Part of the premise of
ExpECON is that making economic growth part
of the overall strategy when conducting military
operations can help achieve strategic success. This
does not mean charity or conventional aid projects
or large infrastructure reconstruction. It means
helping to develop an indigenous private business
sector that will create jobs, give citizens a stake in
the outcome, and provide an income stream for
the host nation government. In this way, economic
success, however modest, should help bring
along the other objectives of post-conflict efforts,
including rule of law, governance, legitimacy, and
reducing corruption.
What follows is a brief overview of some of
the key ideas behind Expeditionary Economics,
followed by a proposed research agenda. Those
seeking a laundry list of what steps to follow in
any given country will not (yet) be satisfied. This
document is intended to open a dialogue and
invite participation. International security depends
on economic growth: We must create the space in
which to develop new ideas and approaches.
